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CRIMINAL LAw-AcQUITTAL OF MURDER AS A BAR TO INDICTMENT FOR
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.-The defendafit was acquitted on an indictment for murder. He was subsequently indicted for involuntary manslaughter
to which he pleaded former acquittal. Held: The plea was good. Commonwealth v. Greevy, Appellant, 75 Pa. Super. 116 (1920).
To render a plea of former acquittal available it is held that the second
indictment must be for the identical crime alleged in the first, i. e., the offense
charged in both indictments must be identically the same both in law and fact.
Wilson v. State, 24 Conn. 57 (1855); Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 496
(Mass. 1832); 4 Bl. Comm. 336; 1 Chitty Cr. Law, 452. Thus an indictment
and trial of a public official for accepting a bribe from a corporation does not
bar an indictment for receiving the same money from an officer of the corporation. Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344 (1905). Where the offense charged
in the first indictment includes in it a lesser offense of which the defendant could
have been convicted on the first trial, an acquittal under the first indictment is a
bar to a prosecution for the minor offense. State v. Brannon, 55 Mo. 63, 17 Am.
Rep. 643 (1874); Dinkey v. Commonwealth, i7 Pa. 126, 5 Am. Dec. 542 (1851);
People v. M'Gowan, 17 Wend. 386 (N. Y. 1837). But where the defendant
could not have been convicted of the second charge on the first indictment, an
acquittal on the first is no bar. Hilands v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 372 (1886).
In Pennsylvania there can be no conviction of involuntary manslaughter
upon an indictment for murder. Walters v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 135 (1862);
Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 S. & R. 423 (Pa. 1821). Thus under the above
general rules the defendant in the principal case should not be entitled to the
plea of former acquittal since on the indictment for murder, he could not have
been convicted of involuntary manslaughter. But the court in the principal
case proceeds on the theory that a general verdict of not guilty upon the trial
of an indictment for murder, negatives the fact of the unlawful killing.
It is difficult to justify the decision on this ground since a verdict is the
determination of the jury upon the matters of fact in issue. Johnson Bros.
v. Glaspey and Rennie, 16 N. D. 335, 113 N. W. 602 (1907); Patterson v. United
States, 15 U. S. 225 (1817). In an indictment for murder the fact in issue is
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of murder or voluntary manslaughter
since these are the only offenses of which he can be convicted. Commonwealth
v. Gable, supra. Thus how can the verdict decide whether the defendant is
guilty or not guilty of involuntary manslaughter, a fact which is not in issue?
It is interesting to note the distinction made by the courts of Pennsyl
vania between a plea of former jeopardy and a plea of former acquittal. Article i, Section io of the Constitution provides that no one shall, for the same
offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. This has been interpreted by
the courts as being applicable only to capital offenses. McCreary v. Common-.
wealth, 29 Pa. 323 (1857). Furthermore, a verdict is not essential to sustain
such a plea since jeopardy attaches when the jury is impanelled and sworn.
McFadden v. Commonwealth, 23 Pa. 12 (1853). In offenses less than capital,
it is held that the common law plea of former acquittal is a bar to a subsequent
(278)
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prosecution for the same crime. Dinkey v. Commonwealth, supra. Thus,
in the principal case, in view of these distinctions, since involuntary manslaughter
is not a capital offense in Pennsylvania (Act March 31, I86O, P. L. 382, Sec. 79),
the plea of former jeopardy would not have been a bar even though the offenses
in both indictments had been the same.
EQUITY PLEADING-STATUTE OF FRAUDs-AvAILABITY ON DEMURRER.-

A bill in equity for the specific performance of an agreement to convey land was
demurred to, on the ground that there was no allegation in the bill that the
contract was in writing. Held: Demurrer overruled, since no such allegation
is necessary. Douma v. Powers, III Atl. 5o (N. J. 1920).
It has been the rule in England, since the time of Lord Holt, that a declaration in an action at law is not demurrable for failure to allege compliance with the
Statute of Frauds. Anonymous, 2 Salk. 519 (Eng. 1708). The rule in equity
was precisely the contrary. Wood v. Midgley, 5 De G. M. & G. 41 (Eng. 1854).
The Judicature Acts, however, eliminated this distinction, and made the practice
in equity conform to that in law. Futcher v. Futcher, 29 W. R. 884 (Eng.
1881).
A few jurisdictions in the United States take the view that failure to allege
compliance with the Statute of Frauds renders a declaration demurrable. Duncan v. Clements, 17 Ark. 279 (1856); Babcock v. Meek, 45 Iowa 137 (1876);
Smith v. Theobald, 86 Ky. 141, 5 S. W. 394 (1887); Powder River Co. v. Lamb,
38 Neb. 339, 56 N. W. iox9 (1893); Lowe v. Turpie, 147 Ind. 652, 44 N. E. 25
(1896). The great weight of authority, however, is in accord with the present
English rule. Walker v. Richards, 39 N. H. 259 (1859); Kroll v. Diamond Co.
IO6 Mich. 127, 63 N. W. 983 (1895); Phillips v. Hardenberg, I8I Mo. 463, 8o
S. W. 891 (z9o4).

It seems that New Jersey was the only state which followed the English
practice as it was prior to the Judicature Acts. Thus, in an action at law, a
demurrer would not lie for failure to allege compliance with the Statute of Frauds.
Hinchman v. Rutan, 31 N. J. L. 496 (1864); Whitehead v. Burgess, 6I N. J. L.
75, 38 Atl. 8o2 (1897). In equity, the contrary was true. Titus v. Taylor, 65
Atl. ioo3 (N. J. 1907); Cemetery Co. v. Frank, 104 Atl. 594 (N. J. 1911).

The

principal case has the same effect as the Judicature Acts, abolishing the previous
equity rule (thus overruling Titus v. Taylor, supra), and adopting the legal rule
for use in equity.
EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION AcTs.-The deceased,
an employee of the defendant company, was caught in the collapse of the defendant's factory and killed. At the trial before the workmen's compensation commission, certain hearsay evidence was admitted, but in denying the right to
compensation, the commission disregarded it, thinking it incompetent. The
evidence was corroborated by circumstantial evidence insufficient in itself.
Held: it was error to disregard the evidence. Reid v. Automatic Electric
Washer Co., 179 N. W. 323 (Iowa 1920).
In the Workmen's Compensation Acts of many of the states, it is provided
that the tribunal which determines issues of fact shall not be bound by the
technical rules of evidence. Iowa has such a provision, but its act also provides
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that the tribunal's decisions are subject to review by the courts upon the facts.
Sections 15 and 17, Ch. 27, 37 G. A. Iowa, 1917.

The hearsay evidence in the

principal case consisted of certain statements made to the testifying witness
and an affidavit of one who was with the deceased at the time of the accident.
The evidence was offered to prove that the deceased was performing his duties
as employee of the defendant company when he was killed. The only evidence
corroborative of this hearsay was circumstantial, the place where the body was
found and his whereabouts shortly before the collapse of the building. The
court said that although an award founded on hearsay evidence alone would not
be supported, yet if that evidence is corroborated even by merely circumstantial
evidence and on review of all of the evidence, the trial tribunal thinks compensation should be given, an award would be upheld provided the court also thinks
all the evidence warrants such a finding.
Brief mention of the cases in one or two states on this subject seems pertinent. The New York Act in addition to relaxing the technical rules of evidence
provides that there shall be a presumption that in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary, the claim comes within the provisions of the Act.
Sects. 68 and 21, Laws of N. Y. 1914, Ch. 41; Cons. Laws Ch. 67.

Under this

a finding of fact based on hearsay with very meagre corroborative evidence has
been upheld. Hernon v. Holohan, 182 N. Y. App. Div. 126, i69, N. Y. S.
705 (1918). And one case goes to the extent of allowing compensation when
the only evidence offered was hearsay. Lindquest v. Holler, 178 N. Y. App.
Div. 317; i64 N. Y. S. 9o6 (1917). In Pennsylvania, however, the Act provides
no such presumption. Section 428 of the 1915 Act provided that neither the
Compensation Board nor any referee shall be bound by the technical rules of"
evidence. Laws of Pa. 1915, P. L. 736. This has been interpreted to mean
that after all of the data has been gathered without regard to technical rules,
then the proofs must be examined, and that which is not evidence within the
meaning of the law must be excluded from consideration; that is, the finding
must rest upon such relevant and competent evidence of sound, probative
character as may be left, be this either circumstantial or direct. McCauley v.
Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa. 312, io4 Atl. 617 (i918); Wolford v. Geisel M.
& S. Co., 262 Pa. 454, io5 Atl. 831 (1919). This is the view adopted in the
amendment to the Act passed in 19g.
Sect. 422, Laws of Pa. x919 P. L. 642.
EVIDENCE-SILENCE AS AN IMPLIED ADMISSION oi GumLT.-The defendant with one Curry was arrested on a charge of larceny. At the preliminary
examination Curry made a confession in which he accused the defendant of
being a party to the crime. The defendant was interrogated in regard to this
statement and replied that on the advice of counsel he would not speak. Held:
That the confession of Curry coupled with the silence of the defendant on being
accused by Curry was admissible as an implied admission of guilt. People v.
Graney, 192 Pac. 460 (Cal. 1920).
Where on being accused of crime, with full liberty to speak, one remains
silent, his failure to reply or deny is relevant as tending to show his guilt. Com-

monwealth v. Spiropoulos, 2o8 Mass. 71, 94 N. E. 451 (1911); Commonwealth
v. Aston, 227 Pa. 112, 75 Atl. io19 (I9Io). The accusation or incriminating

statement is also admissible, not as evidence of the truth of the facts stated, but
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to show the accused's implied admission of guilt by silence. People v. Byrne,
16o Cal. 217, 1i6 Pac. 521 (1911); Commonwealth v. Dewhirst, igo Mass.
293, 76 N. E. 1052 (i9o6).

The question in each case to be determined is whether the accused has
such liberty under the circumstances as to place a duty upon him to reply to
the accusation. It is therefore held that silence as an implied admission of the
truth of statements made in the presence of the accused does not apply to silence
at a judicial proceeding or hearing. There is no such liberty as calls for a reply.
People v. Hillhouse, 80 Mich. 580, 45 N. W. 484 (189o); Commonwealth v.
Zorambo, 205 Pa. 109, 54 AtI. 716 (i9o3); State v. Hale, 156 Mo. io2, 56 S. W.
881 (19oo).

The courts are not in harmony as to whether the mere fact of arrest takes
away that liberty which calls for a reply to all accusations. Some courts hold
that the fact that the accused is under arrest and in the custody of an officer
removes any necessity for a reply by the accused to the accusations. Commonwealth v. Spiropoulos, supra; Merriweather v. Commonwealth, i8 Ky. 870,
82 S. W. 592 (I9O4); State v. Kelleher, 201 Mo. 614, 100 S. W. 470 (19o7).
-

These courts have therefore held that where the accused, as in the principal
case, has been advised by his counsel not to talk, the accusation and silence of
the accused thereon are not admissible as an implied admission of guilt. People
v. Pfanschmidt, 262 Ill. 4x, 1o4 N. E. 8o4 (1914); ]People v. Conrow, 2o0 N. Y.
356, 93 N. E. 943 (1911).

Other courts hold that the accusation of a crime does call for a reply, even
from a person under arrest. Simmons v. State, 7 Ala. App. 107, 61 So. 466
(1913); Morrison v. State, 125 Ark. 4o2, 188 S. W. i187 (1916); People v.
Amaya, 134 Cal. 531, 66 Pac. 794 (xgoi). Following their own decisions on this
point the California court has extended their rule in the principal case, so that
even when advised by'counsel not to talk, there is a duty upon a prisoner to deny
all accusations made in his presence.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-MERCHANT VESSELS IN ENEMY PORTS AT OUTUREAK
OF WAR-RIGHT TO DEPART.-The Marie Leonhardt, a German merchant
steamer in -the Port of London at the outbreak of the World War, which had
been detained by virtue of a decree of the Prize Court, was made the subject
of a: test case to determine whether German merchant vessels found in British
ports at the opening of hostilities were properly detained, or whether by custom
they should have been given leave to depart. Held: The vessel was properly
detained, since no such custom exists. The Marie Leonhardt, 37 T. L. R. 24
(Eng. 1920).
The early rule, stated by Lord Mansfield, clearly negatives the existence
of such a custom: "Upon the declaration of war, or hostilities, all the ships of
the enemy are detained in our ports, to be confiscated as the property of the
enemy, if no reciprocal agreement is made." Lindo v. Rodney, 2 Doug. 613n,
615 (Eng. 1782).
Beginning with the Crimean War, however, a new usage of d~lais de
faveur (days of grace) arose, allowing enemy merchant vessels a certain period
of time within which to depart freely, entirely irrespective of reciprocal agreements. Turkey took the first step by granting a d6lai of six weeks to Russia,
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which was speedily followed by likie action on the part of the other belligerents.
A similar course was taken in the Franco-Prussian War, the Russo-Turkish War
of 1878, the Graeco-Turkish War of 1897, the Spanish-American War, and the
Russo-Japanese War, varying periods of grace being allowed. Garner: International Law and the World War (1920), vol I, 149.
There is some question whether or not this practice, followed in all the
great wars of a half-century, had, previous to the Hague Peace Conferences,
become of binding force. There are no recent authorities which definitely deny
such a custom, although some do not mention it at all. Two writers, on the
contrary, consider it a rule of law. John Bassett Moore: Digest of International
Law (i9O6), vol. VII, 453; James Brown Scott: Hague Peace Conferences
(I9O9), vol. I, 563. The majority, however, do not treat it as certain, but speak
of it as if probably binding, using such expressions as: "it became a usage, if
not a custom." Oppenheim: International Law (2nd Ed., 1912), vol. II,
i4o; Wilson: International Law (191o), 290; Hershey: International Public
Law (1912), 364; Westlake: International Law (2nd Ed., 1913), vol. II, 42;
'Wheaton: International Law (5th Eng. Ed., 1916), 422.
The Second Hague Conference (1907) attempted to settle the question.
Germany, Russia, and the United States favored the recognition of a right to
depart within a reasonable period, but the opposition of Great Britain, supported by France, Japan, and Argentina, prevailed. As a result, the granting
of leave to depart is left as a mere matter of grace, by the statement in Convention VI, Article I, that "it is desirable that" such vessels "be permitted to depart freely, immediately or after a sufficient d6lai de faveur."
By Article 6, however, the Convention applies "only if the belligerents
are all parties to the Convention." Such was not the case in the World War,
so it would seem that the question should be treated as if arising before the
Hague Conferences, in which case, as shown above, the weight of authority
appears to favor the existence of a right to depart, not conditioned on reciprocal
agreement. As was to be expected from the British opposition to this doctrine
at the Hague, the principal case repudiates it, and follows Lindo v. Rodney,
supra. However, the World War seems to have brought about a general repudiation of the doctrine, since the practice of the Prize Courts of all the belligerents, with the exception of Germany, has, in similar cases, been like that of
the British court in the principal case. Garner: International Law and the
World War (1920), vol I, 147 et seg. The United States denied the right of
German merchant vessels to depart, largely on the ground that they came under
Article 5 of Convention VI, which provides that the Convention does not apply
to "merchant vessels whose construction indicates that they are intended to be
transformed into war vessels" of any kind. Whatever the rule may have been,
however, it seems clear that the World War has brought about the restoration
of the earlier doctrine, and that today no right to depart exists, in the absence
of reciprocal agreement.
REs ADJuDIcATA-AcTION IN COVENANT BARRED BY JUDGMENT IN
DEBT.-The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant by contract under
seal as its buyer and manager at a salary of $ioo per week, payable weekly, the
contract to be effective from February I, 1914 to January I, 1919.

On February-
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27, 1918, the plaintiff was discharged withcut justification, and thereafter performed no services for the defendant, although ready and willing to do so. On
March 8, 1918 the plaintiff brought an action of debt for $ioo for wages for the
week of February 24, and recovered the amount claimed. The plaintiff then
brought an action in covenant to recover damages for breach of the contract.
Held: the action cannot be maintained, as the previous recovery was a bar to
further action for damages. Brand v. Ogden-Howard Co., III Atl. 370 (Del.
1920).

It is generally recognized that an employee discharged without sufficient
legal excuse before the expiration of his term of service has an election of remedies,
viz., (I) He may treat the contract as rescinded and sue on a quantum meruit
for the value of the services actually rendered. Davidson v. Laughlin, 138
Cal. 320, 71 Pac. 345 (19o3); Keedy v. Long 71 Md. 385, 18 Atl. 704 (1889).
(2) He may treat the contract as continuing and sue at once for the breach
thereof, and recover his probable damages as well as any amount due and unpaid
up to the time of discharge. Howay v. Going-Northrup Co., 24 Wash. 88,
64 Pac. 135 (1go1). (3) In cases where the Statute of Limitations does not
intervene, he may defer suit until the end of the term of employment provided
for in the contract, and sue for his actual damages. Allen v. Colliery Engineers
Co., 196 Pa. 512, 46 Atl. 899 (19oo); Lichtenstein v. Brooks, 75 Tex. 196, 12
S. W. 975 (1889).
Some courts have held that the employee may, if his wages are payable
in installments such as by the month, maintain separate suits for each installment as it falls due. McMullin v. Dickinson Co. 6o Minn. 156 (1895); Allen
v. Colliery Engineers Co., supra. Other courts have recognized the doctrine of
"constructive service," according to which the servant wrongfully discharged
may at the end of the term maintain an action for the full amount of the wages
due from the time of discharge, on the ground that readiness to perform is equivalent to performance under the contract. This theory has been repudiated in
England. Goodman v. Pocock, 15 Q. B. 576 (185o). In the United States
the majority of jurisdictions do not recognize such a remedy. Smith v. Cashie
Lumber Co. 54 S. E. 788 (N. C. 19o6).
In the principal-case, it was contended that, as the previous action for
debt was brought for wages and not for breach of contract, the former recovery
was no bar. The theory has support in some of the cases. Perry v. Dickerson
85 N. Y. 345 (I88r). But it is to be noted that the plaintiff's case is not within
the theory. The plaintiff was discharged on February 27, 1918. He had been
paid up until February 24. His previous action in debt, therefore, being based
on wages alleged to be due from February 24 to March 2 was an action for more
than wages due up until the time of the discharge. It included wages for three
days when he was not working. The recovery for these three days could only
be based on an action for breach of contract. Arnold v. Adams 27 N. Y. App.
Div. 345 (1898). Therefore, although the former recovery was erroneously
allowed in an action of debt, the present action was rightly held not to be maintainable. Goodman v. Pocock, supra.
TORTS-AGENT PROCURING BREACH OF PaiNclPA.'s

CONTRACT.-The

plaintiff, having been refused a ticket of admission by a theatre company, pro-
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cured one through a friend who purchased it for him. He, nevertheless, was
refused admission on orders of the defendant, the managing director of the
theatre company. This action was brought" for procuring a breach of the contract of admission between the plaintiff and the theatre company. Held: Plaintiff can not recover.

Said v. Butt, 36 T. L. R. 762 (Eng. I92O).

In both England and the United States, it is held that a ticket to a theatre
or other place of amusement is a revocable license. Homey v. Nixon, 213 Pa.
2o, 61 Atl. io88 (19o5); Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838 (Eng. 1845). By
the weight of authority in this country, the license is revocable at will. Homey
v. Nixon, supra; Johnson v. Wilkinson, 139 Mass. 4, 29 N. E. 62 (1885); Burton
v. Scherpf, i Allen 133, 79 Am. Dec. 717 (Mass. 1861). According to the English view, such license cannot be revoked so long as the holder keeps within the
regulations imposed by the management. Hurst v. Picture Theatres, 3o T. L.
R. 642 (Eng. 1914). Whether the courts consider that there is a contract
between the holder of a theatre ticket and the theatre company is difficult to
determine. According to the dicta in numerous cases, it would seem that a
contract does exist since it is stated that the remedy of the purchaser, where the
license is revoked, is an action on the contract for damages sustained by the
breach. Taylor v. Cohn, 47 Ore. 538, 84 Pac. 388 (I9o6); Homey v. Nixon,
supra. Upon the authority of this dicta there was in the principal case, a valid
contract between the person who purchased the ticket for the plaintiff and the
theatre company.
The question is whether there was such a contract between the plaintiff
and the theatre company. The court in the principal case decided this in the
negative on the ground that the theatre company would not knowingly have
sold a ticket to the plaintiff and therefore, the plaintiff, knowing this fact, could
not make himself a contracting party by procuring a third person to purchase
a ticket for him. It is held that where an agent contracts with a third party
for an undisclosed principal, the principal may hold the third party to the contract. Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush. 371 (Mass. i85I); Cothay v. Fennell,
io B. & C. 671 (Eng. 1830). But whether there is a valid contract between the
principal and third party where the latter would not knowingly have contracted
with the principal involves some difficulty., It has been held in such a case
that there is a valid contract between the principal and third party. Kelly
Asphalt Block Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 136 N. Y. App. Div. 22, 120
N.Y. S. 163 (19o9) ; Kayton v. Barnett, I6 N. Y. 625 (1889). On the other
hand, it was stated in Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28 (1877), that a party
has a right to select and determine with whom he will contract and he cannot
have another person thrust upon him without his consent. Applying this principle to the case where an agent makes a contract for an undisclosed principal,
there would be no contract where the third party would not knowingly have
contracted with the principal. This would seem logical for the reason that a
contract involves a mutual agreement and it would be difficult to find mutuality
where one of the parties would not knowingly have made the contract with the
other. Under this view, there was no contract between the plaintiff and the
theatre company in the principal case and the defendant therefore, could not
be held liable for its breach.
Assuming that there was a valid contract, the remaining question is whether
the defendant would be liable to the plaintiff for procuring its breach on the
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authority of Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B, 216 (Eug. 1853). That case held that
one who maliciously or without justifiable cause induces a person to break his
contract with another will be liable to the latter for the damages resulting from
such breach. The court in the principal case, decided, even assuming there was
a valid contract, that the rule of Lumley v. Gye was not applicable and therefore the defendant was not liable. This decision proceeded on the ground that
the defendant was the servant of -the theatre company and his acts, within the
scope of his authority ,were in law the acts of the theatre company. The decision,
confined to the facts of the principal case, would seem to be correct. According to the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye, there must be an act which is the breach
and an act which is the procurement of the breach. Thus, where a corporation
vests in an agent the power to manage its business and to repudiate the corporation's contracts at his discretion, how can it be said that the bonafide breaking of the contract by him is also the act of procuring the corporation to break
the contract? It is illogical to hold that the act of breaking a contract is the act
of procuring another to break the contract. It would seem that the bona fide
act of the agent in such a case where he has the management of the corporation
is the act of the corporation itself.
TORTS-INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT-JUST CAusE.-The defendant
company was the owner of oil tanks and the plaintiff ran a tent-boarding house
nearby. A fire broke out among the tanks and to move his tent to safety, the
plaintiff employed one Hays for the day to help him. One of the defendant's
foremen induced Hays to break his contract with the plaintiff and help him
protect the defendant's property. The plaintiff, being unable to move his
property alone, lost a large part of it, for which he brought this action. Held:
the defendant Company is liable for the interference of its foreman with the
contract rights of the plaintiff, because such interference was without legal
justification. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Kinney, 192 Pac. 586 (1920).
A party who maliciously interferes with the performance of a contract,
has perpetrated an actionable wrong. A malicious act in this connection is a
wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. Bromage v.
Prosser, 4 B. & C. 247 (1825). In the principal case, the question was raised
whether or not the intention to save one's own property was just cause or excuse.
If one tears down the house of another to check a conflagration which
threatens the community, or commits some other trespass to arrest a public
danger, his trespass is justified, for the property of an individual may be sacrificed
for a public necessity. Field v. The City of Des Moines, 39 Iowa, 575, (1874);
Bowditch v. Boston, ioi U. S. i6 (1879). Although he may thus act for the
benefit of the community, if he trespasses upon the property of another for the
sole purpose of protecting his own property, the trespass is not justified. Grant
v. Allen, 41 Conn. 156, (1874). A mere technical trespass has been held excused,
however, if necessary to save the intruder's life, Ploof v. Putnam 8i Vt. 471,
71 Atl. 188 (19o8), though even here it has been held that he must pay for any
harm done to the premises by his unauthorized act. Vincent v. Lake Erie
Transportation Co., io9 Minn. 456, 124 N. W. 221 (I9IO).
If, however, the force which threatens his property arises from the acts
of another, he may injure the property of that other in order to protect his own
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with legal justification. Miles v. Hutchinson, (1903) 2 K. B. 714; Lipe v.
Blackwelder, 25 Ill. App. 119 (1886). The same is true where a man kills another to save his own life. He is justified if the deceased threatened him. Beard
v. U. S., 158 U.S. 55o (1894). But he is not'justified if he deliberately kills an
innocent person to save his own life threatened by a third person. Arp. v. State,
97 Ala. 5, 12 So. 301, (1892).
It has been said that a malicious act is one done for the indirect purpose
of injuring the plaintiff or b5enefitting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff. Bowen v. Hall, (1881) 6 Q. B. D. 333. In the principal case, there was
such an act, and the justification alleged was the saving of the defendant's property, but this as we have seen, is insufficient. True, there was not a destruction
of the plaintiff's property, but there was a depriving the plaintiff of his means
of saving it, which, it is suggested, is equivalent to a destruction in such a case.
The court in the principal case based its decision on the grounds that the
defendant did not show that the services of the said Hays nor the destruction
of the plaintiff's property were necessary to check the fire, nor that there was any
-other property in danger, nor that he was unable to procure the services of some
other man. It is submitted that even had such necessity been proven, the
defendant's interference with the plaintiff's contract with Hays would not have
been justified.
TORTs-PRoxIMATE CAUsE-SuICIDE RESULTING FROM AN ACCIDENT
DOES NOT BREAK TEE CHAIN OF CAUSATION-A workman received a severe

injury to his hand in November, i919. Although his condition was improving
he continually brooded over the injury and in February, 1920, committed suicide. The evidence tended to show that the melancholia (a form of insanity),
resulting from the accident caused him to commit suicide. Held: That the
suicide did not break the chain of causation and the widow was awarded compensation under the English Workmen's Compensation Act. Marriott v.
Maltby Main Colliery Co., 37 T. L. R. 123 (Eng. 1920).
This is the first
reported English decision that has actually held that a
suicide, resulting from insanity caused by the misconduct of the defendant,
does not break the chain of causation. In an earlier English case, however, there
is a dictum to that effect. Withers v. London, Brighton & South Coast Railway,
(1916) 2 K. B. 772. In a Scottish case also it has been held that where a workman had become insane as the result of an accident and committed suicide, the
widow should be allowed to show whether the act of suicide was the result of
the accident. Malone v. Cayzer, Irvine & Co., 45 Scottish L. R. 351 (19o8).
Though these cases all came up under the Workmen's Compensation Act, yet
the courts did not base their decisions upon any peculiar language contained
therein. The reasoning of the court lays down the proposition as general law.
It can therefore be safely stated that the English rule is that where a man commits suicide under the impulse of insanity, itself caused by an injury due to the
misconduct of the defendant, then, no matter how premeditated the suicide may
be, the chain of causation is not broken. All that need be shown is that the injury and not a mere "brooding over the accident" caused the insanity of the
deceased which impelled the suicide.
The generally accepted American rule is much more restricted. Only
where "death is the result of an uncontrollable impulse, or is'accomplished in
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delirium or frenzy" caused by the accident, is the defendant liable for death
by suicide. In all other cases the intervening and independent act of suicide
breaks the chain of causation. That the deceased was insane so as to be free
from moral responsibility is not enough to make the defendant liable. Any suicide which shows an intelligent selection of means appropriate for its consummation is an independent act which breaks the chain of causation and relieves the
defendant from liability. Scheffer v. Railroad, 105 U. S. 249 (1881); Washington & Georgetown Road v. Hickey, 166 U. S. 521 (1897); Kock v. Fox, 71 N.
Y. App. 288 (1902); Daniels v. N. Y. N. H. & Hartford Railroad, 183 Mass.
393, 67 N. E. 424 (19o3); Brown v. American Steel & Wire Company, 43 Ind.
App. 56o (i9o9). In only one American jurisdiction, South Dakota, is the law
the same as the English rule established in the principal case. Garrigan v.
Kennedy, i9 S. D. ii (19o4).
TORTS-RELEASE OF ONE JOINT TORT FEA sOR.-The plaintiff sued the
defendants for a conspiracy to defraud. The action was dismissed on the ground
that the plaintiff had, for a consideration, released another party from liability
for the same conspiracy. Held: The dismissal was correct. Betcher v. Kunz
et. al. 192 Pac. 955 (Wash. 1920).
The practically universal rule is that a release under seal to one of several
joint tort-feasors releases all, even in the presefice of a stipulation in the release
that it shall not do so. Partridge v. Emson, (Eng. 1597) Noy 62; Gunther v.
Lee, 45 Md. 60, 24 Am. Rep. 504 (1876); DeLong v. Curtis, 35 Hun 94 (N. Y.
1885); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Pioneer Iron Works, 34 Fed. 338 (1888); Rogers
v. Cox, 66 N. J. L. 432, 5o Atl. 143 (xgoi). The reason given is that the stipulation is void because repugnant to the legal effect of the release, which, being
under seal, is deemed a complete satisfaction. Rogers v. Cox, supra. Many
courts give the same effect to the release whether it is under seal or not. Urton
v. Price 57 Cal. 270 (1881); Seither v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 125 Pa. 397,
17 Atl. 338 (1889); Abb. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.,28 Wash. 428, 68 Pac.
954 (i9oR). The reason generally given when the release is not under seal is
that no agreement betieen the parties can change the rule of law that the injured party is entitled to but one satisfaction. Smith v. Consolidated Gas Co.
et al., 72 N. Y. Supp. io84 (igoi). The historically accurate reason, however,
is that the liability which arises out of a joint tort, although joint and several,
is nevertheless one and indivisible, Partridge v. Emson, supra, and that therefore a release of that liability as to one, necessarily extinguishes it as to all.
An increasing number of decisions are departing from this rule on the ground
that when the parties expressly reserve the liability of the other tort-feasor the
presumption that full satisfaction has been received is rebutted, and in reason
and equity the intent of the parties should be given effect. Pogel v. Meilke,
60 Wis. 248, I8 N. W. 927 (1884); El Paso & S. W. R. Co. v. Darr, 93 S.W.
166 (Tex. 19o6); Edens v. Fletcher, 79 Kan. x39, 98 Pac. 784, (19o8). Adopting
this attitude the courts allow an inquiry into the consideration for the release,
and, where the damages are capable of computation and are not fully satisfied
by the consideration, the release is held not to discharge the other tort-feasors
but to benefit them only to the extent of subtracting the amount of the consideration from their liability. Miller v. Fenton, I Paige Ch. Rep. (N. Y.) 20,
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1884, Chamberlain v. Murphy, 41 Vt. Io (1868); El Paso & S. W. R.Co. v.
Darr, supra. The same equitable result is reached in other cases by construing
the document not to be a release, but a covenant not to sue. Duck v. Mayeu
(1892) 2 Q. B. 5In; Arnet v. Missouri P. R. Co., 64 Mo. App. 368, (1895); Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N. Y. 455, 66 N. E. 133, (1903); Chicago &-A. R. Co. v.
Averill, 224 IIl. 516, 79 N. E. 654, (igo6).
The rule that a release to one releases all is conveniently arbitrary and
can be supported as the logical conclusion from the law of joint torts and satisfaction. But, it is submitted that the decisions which, wherever possible,
allow the intentions of the parties to regulate the extent to which a release shall
operate, are more in harmony with the tendency of modem law, which is to do
justice rather than to adhere strictly to the formal and technical commandments
of the old common law, and the logical conclusions therefrom.
TRUSTS-PRNCIPAL AND INCOME-RIGHT TO SUBSCRIBE FOR NEW SHAREs.

-The plaintiff, a life tenant entitled to income under a trust of certain shares
of stock, petitioned the court for a decree requiring the trustee to pay to him
the proceeds of the sale of the right to buy at par an equal number of new shares
in the same company. The petition was refused. 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 373 (1920).
In determining the right, between life tenant and remainderman, to distributions made by corporations, the first problem is to determine the intention
manifested by the will or other instrument by which the right to income is, for
the time being, severed from the corpus. Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549
(89o); In re Sherman Trust, I79 N. W. 1O9 (Iowa, 1920). In general, however, the instrument merely directs the payment of "income" to the life tenant,
and is not sufficiently explicit to cover any case where the corporation makes a
slightly unusual form of distribution. The law has treated this situation in
various ways in different jurisdictions. The early English rule, now discarded,
gave everything except the regular annual cash dividends to the corpus of the
estate. Brander v. Brander, 4 Ves. Jr. 80o (1799); Irving v. Houston, 4 Paton
(H. L.) 521 (18o3). The Massachusetts and later English rule, commendable
for its simplicity but arbitrary and often unjust, is that cash dividends are income, while stock dividends are accretion to capital. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass.
ioi (1868); Bouch v. Sproule, (1887) L. R. 12 App. Cas. 385; Gibbons v. Mahon, supra. Another rule, applied first by the courts of New York and Kentucky, rejects the character of the dividend, cash or stock, as a criterion, and
treats any distribution from earnings past or current as income. It refuses to
apportion where the dividend was earned partly before and partly after the
inception of the life estate, and treats the dividend as accruing in its entirety
as of the date when it was declared. In re Kernochan, 1O4 N. Y. 618, 1I N. E.
149 (1887); Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778 (1892). The rule known as
the Pennsylvania rule, like the one just stated, rejects the cash or stock character
of the dividend as a test, but goes further and inquires into the period covered
by the accumulation of the earnings from which the dividend was declared, and
gives the life tenant only the portion which has been earned during his tenancy.
Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857); Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 21 Atl. 438
(i8gi); Land v. Lang, 57 N. J. Eq. 325, 41 Atl. 705 (1898); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 74 N. H. 201, 66 Atl. 124 (1907). This rule, while it is the most difficult
of application, is generally considered the fairest.
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In the principal case there appears to have been no finding as to when
the earnings accumulated which made the right to buy the new stock valuable,
but the reasons advanced by the court for holding the right to be capital are
such as one would expect from a court that considers the cash or stock character
of the dividend significant. Although most of the authorities arbitrarily hold
that the right to subscribe for new shares is capital, Rand v. Hubbell, Iis Mass.
461 (1874); Eisner's Appeal, 175 Pa. 143, 34 Atl. 577 (1896), it has been held
that if the value of the right to buy stock is due to earnings accumulated since
the beginning of the life tenancy, the right is income and belongs to the life
tenant. Wiltbank's Appeal, 64 Pa. 256 (1870); Holbrook v. Holbrook, supra.
Logically, where the Pennsylvania rule including as it does the principle of
apportionment is law, it should extend to distributions when made in the form of
stock rights, as when made in cash or stock.
WATERS AND WATER COURSES-SUBsTITUTION oF NEW CUANNEL-DUTY
To ANTIcIPATE UNUSUAL FLooDs.-The defendant closed the channel of a

stream and made a new channel of smaller capacity.

The flooding of the stream

by rains of great severity damaged the plaintiff's land below. Held: The defendant was liable for the injury. Though his duty was to provide a channel
to carry away waters reasonably to be expected, and not to substitute one of
equal capacity, yet as heavy rains were to be expected here, the present flood,
though unusual, was not unprecedented, and -should have been anticipated.
Eikland et. al. v. Casey et. al., 266 Fed. 821 (1920).
The English cases are clear that a riparian owner who changes the flow of
water from a natural to a substituted and artificial channel is liable for any
injury resulting to the lower proprietor. M'Lean v. Crosson, 33 U. C. Q. B.
448 (1873). He must see that the capacity of the new channel is in all respects
equal to that of the old one, and will be liable for any injury caused by an overflow in case it is not. Fletcher v. Smith, L. R. 2 App. Cas. 781 (Eng. 1877).
This is the case, even though the rains were extraordinary or even unprecedented.
Greenock Corporation v. Caledonian Railway, L. R. A. C. 556 (Eng. 1917).
Liability is not avoided even though a channel of equal size is substituted, if it
is constructed so as to be more liable to overflow, and the overflow is the result
of such method of construction. Fletcher v. Smith, supra.
The court in the principal case considered in point the doctrine of Rylands
v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 33o (Eng. 1868), which makes a person who collects
and keeps on his land any artificial substances a virtual insurer of his neighbor
for all damages resulting to him from the escape of such substances. Since
this doctrine, however, has been generally repudiated in the United States, the
court thereby felt itself bound to reject the English rule above given, regarding
water-courses. The reasoning of the court in this respect, it is submitted, is
erroneous. It is clearly pointed out in the opinion of Lord Wrenbury in Greenock Corporation v. Caledonian Railway, supra, that the case of Rylands v.
Fletcher is not applicable to this situation, since the construction of a reservoir'
on one's own land is a lawful act, while the diversion of a stream so as to render
it less efficient is in itself a wrong.
It is also submitted that the duty of one diverting a stream is not as suggested, to provide a new channel equal to the old; but, the very act of diversion
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being a wrong, the diverter is liable for all the consequences which follow. It is
to his interest to substitute an adequate channel, but there is no new duty imposed to make it equal to the natural one.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INTERSTATE ComMERcE-NATURE 6F THE
EMPLOYMENT.-An employee, acting for the day as fireman on one of the defend-

ant's trains made up partly of cars bearing interstate commerce, completed his
days work, checked out, and left the premises. After attending to some private
business in the town, he boarded a train, provided by the defendant company
for the transportation of its workmen, and was killed while en route to his home
sixteen miles distant. Held: The workman was in the general employment of
the defendant company at the time of the accident; his interstate relation
ceased when he left the premises. Knorr v. Central Railroad of New Jersey,
268 Pa., 172, iio Atl. 797 (1920).
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that an employee, in
leaving the carrier's yard at the close of the day's work, is discharging a duty of
his employment; and that such an act is a necessary incident of his day's work
and- partakes of the character of that days work as a whole. Erie Railroad
Company v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170 (1916).

In the principal case the court decided that the transportation of the
employee was an incident to his employment which did not cease until he reached
home; and it further decided that the continuity of the employment was not
broken by the workman stopping to transact private business. The distinction,
then, between the principal case and Erie Railroad Company v. Winfield, supra,
is very fine, for it appears to rest upon the single fact that in the former case the
accident occurred after the workman left the premises, while in the latter it
occurred when the employee was in the act of leaving the premises.
It is very clear that in the principal case the employee was, while actually
engaged at work, engaged in interstate commerce. It is therefore difficult to
see how he was converted into some other kind of an employee the moment he
left the premises. On the contrary it appears that the employee should, when
he left the premises, have either retained his character as an interstate employee
or ceased to be in the employment of the defendant company.
The facts of Erie Railroad Company v. Winfield, supra, may not strictly
permit of a broader rule than the one that has been applied in the principal
case. It may properly be argued, however, that the Supreme Court of the
United States would extend the rule so as to cover the facts of the principal case;
for it would seem, if the Pennsylvania court is correct in holding that the employee
was at the time of the accident in the employment of the defendant company
because his transportation was an incident to his employment, that according
to Erie Railroad Company v. Winfield, supra, the interstate character of the
employee's work during the day should follow him and he should have been
held to be engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident.

